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Abstract. The conventional computational description of brain operations has 
to be understood in a metaphorical sense. In this paper arguments supporting 
the claim that this metaphor is too restrictive are presented. A new metaphor 
more accurately describing recently discovered emergent characteristics of 
neuron functionality is proposed and its implications are discussed. A 
connectionist system fitting the new paradigm is presented and its use for 
attention modelling briefly outlined. 
 
Introduction. 
One of the important roles of metaphor in science is to facilitate understanding of 
complex phenomena. Metaphors should describe phenomena in an intuitively 
understandable way that captures their essential features. We argue that a description 
of single neurons as computational devices does not capture the information 
processing complexity of real neurons and argue that describing them in terms of 
communication could provide a better alternative metaphor. These claims are 
supported by recent discoveries showing complex neuronal behaviour and by 
fundamental limitations of established connectionist cognitive models. We suggest 
that real neurons operate on richer information than provided by a single real number 
and therefore their operation cannot be adequately described in standard Euclidean 
setting. Recent findings in neurobiology suggest that, instead of modelling the neuron 
as a logical or numerical function, it could be described as a communication device. 
The prevailing view in neuroscience is that neurons are simple computational 
devices, summing up their inputs and calculating a non-linear output function. 
Information is encoded in the mean firing rate of neurons which exhibit narrow 
specialisation - they are devoted to processing a particular type of input information. 
Further, richly interconnected networks of such neurons learn via adjusting inter-
connection weights. In the literature there exist numerous examples of learning rules 
and architectures, more or less inspired by varying degrees of biological plausibility. 
Almost from the very beginning of connectionism, researchers were fascinated by 
computational capabilities of such devices [1,2].  
The revival of the connectionism in the mid-eighties featured increased interest in 
analysing the properties of such networks [3], as well as in applying them to numerous 
practical problems [4]. At the same time the same devices were proposed as models of 
cognition capable of explaining both higher level mental processes [5] and low level 
information processing in the brain [6]. 
However, these promises were based on the assumption that the computational 
model captures all the important characteristics of real biological neurons with respect 
to information processing. We will indicate in this article that very recent advances in 
neuroscience appear to invalidate this assumption. Neurons are much more complex 
than was originally thought and thus networks of oversimplified model neurons are 
orders of magnitude below complexity of real neuronal systems. From this it follows 
that current neural network ‘technological solutions’ capture only superficial 
properties of biological networks and further, that such networks may be incapable of 
providing a satisfactory explanation of our mental abilities.  
We propose to compliment the description of a single neuron as a computational 
device by an alternative, more ’natural’ metaphor :- we hypothesise that a neuron can 
be better and more naturally described in terms of communication rather than purely 
computation. We hope that shifting the paradigm will result in escaping from local 
minimum caused by treating neurons and their networks merely as computational 
devices. This should allow us to build better models of the brain’s functionality and to 
build devices that reflect more accurately its characteristics. We will present a simple 
connectionist model, NEural STochastic diffusion search netwORk (NESTOR), fitting 
well in this new paradigm and will show that its properties make it interesting from 
both the technological and brain modelling perspectives. 
In a recent paper [7], Selman et al. posed some challenge problems for Artificial 
Intelligence. In particular Rodney Brooks suggested revising the conventional 
McCulloch Pitts neuron model and investigation of the potential implications (with 
respect to our understanding of biological learning) of new neuron models based on 
recent biological data. Further, Selman claimed that the supremacy of standard 
heuristic, domain specific search methods of Artificial Intelligence need to be revised 
and suggested that recent investigation of fast general purpose search procedures has 
opened a promising alternative avenue. Furthermore, in the same paper Horvitz posed 
the development of richer models of attention as an important problem, as all cognitive 
tasks “... require costly resources” and “controlling the allocation of computational 
resources can be a critical issue in maximising the value of a situated system’s 
behaviour.”  
We claim that the new network presented herein addresses all three challenges 
posed in the above review paper [7], as it is isomorphic in operation to Stochastic 
Diffusion Search, a fast, generic probabilistic search procedure which automatically 
allocates information processing resources to search tasks.  
 
Computational metaphor. 
The emergence of connectionism is based on the belief that neurons can be treated as 
simple computational devices [1]. Further, the assumption that information is encoded 
as mean firing rate of neurons was a base assumption of all the sciences related to 
brain modelling. The initial boolean McCulloch-Pitts model neuron was quickly 
extended to allow for analogue computations. 
The most commonly used framework for connectionist information representation 
and processing is a subspace of a Euclidean space. Learning in this framework is 
equivalent to extracting an appropriate mapping from the sets of existing data. Most 
learning algorithms perform computations which adjust neuron interconnection 
weights according to some rule, adjustment in a given time step being a function of a 
training example. Weight updates are successively aggregated until the network 
reaches an equilibrium in which no adjustments are made (or alternatively stopping 
before the equilibrium, if designed to avoid overfitting). In any case knowledge about 
the whole training set is stored in final weights. This means that the network does not 
possess any internal representation of the (potentially complex) relationships between 
training examples. Such information exists only as a distribution of weight values. We 
do not consider representations of arity zero predicates, (e.g. those present in  NETtalk 
[8]), as sufficient for representation of complex relationships. These limitations result 
in poor internal knowledge representation making it difficult to interpret and analyse 
the network in terms of causal relationships. In particular it is difficult to imagine how 
such a system could develop symbolic representation and logical inference (cf. the 
symbolic/connectionist divide). Such deficiencies in the representation of complex 
knowledge by neural networks have long been recognised [9,10,11]. 
The way in which data are processed by a single model neuron is partially 
responsible for these difficulties. The algebraic operations that it performs on input 
vectors are perfectly admissible in Euclidean space but do not necessarily make sense 
in terms of the data represented by these vectors. Weighted sums of quantities, 
averages etc., may be undefined for objects and relations of the real world, which are 
nevertheless represented and learned by structures and mechanisms relying heavily 
on such operations. This is connected with a more fundamental problem missed by the 
connectionist community - the world (and relationships between objects in it) is 
fundamentally non-linear. Classical neural networks are capable of discovering non-
linear, continuous mappings between objects or events but nevertheless they are 
restricted by operating on representations embedded in linear, continuous structures 
(Euclidean space is by definition a finite dimensional linear vector space equipped with 
standard metric). Of course it is possible in principle that knowledge from some domain 
can be represented in terms of Euclidean space. Nevertheless it seems that only in 
extremely simple or artificial problems the appropriate space will be of small 
dimensionality. In real life problems spaces of very high dimensionality are more likely 
to be expected. Moreover, even if embedded in an Euclidean space, the actual set 
representing a particular domain need not be a linear subspace, or be a connected 
subset of it. Yet these are among the topological properties required for the correct 
operation of classical neural nets. There are no general methods of coping with such 
situations in connectionism. Methods that appear to be of some use in such cases 
seem to be freezing some weights (or restriction of their range) or using a ‘mixture of 
experts or gated networks’ [12]. However, there is no a principled way describing how 
to perform the former. Mixture of exp erts models appear to be a better solution, as 
single experts could in principle explore different regions of a high dimensional space 
thus their proper co-operation could result in satisfactory behaviour. However, such 
architectures need to be individually tailored to particular problems. Undoubtedly 
there is some degree of modularity in the brain, however it is not clear that the brain’s 
operation is based solely on a rigid modularity principle. In fact we will argue in the 
next section that biological evidence seems to suggest that this view is at least 
incomplete and needs revision.  
We feel that many of the difficulties outlined above follow from the underlying 
interpretation of neuron functioning in computational terms, which results in entirely 
numerical manipulations of knowledge by neural networks. This seems a too restrictive 
scheme. 
Even in computational neuroscience, existing models of neurons describe them as 
geometric points although neglecting the geometric properties of neurons, (treating 
dendrites and axons as merely passive transmission cables), makes such models very 
abstract and may strip them of some information processing properties. In most 
technical applications of neural networks the abstraction is even higher - axonic and 
dendritic arborisations are completely neglected - hence they cannot in principle model 
the complex information processing taking place in these arbors [13]. 
We think that the brain functioning is best described in terms of non-linear 
dynamics but this means that processing of information is equivalent to some form of 
temporal evolution of activity. The latter however may depend crucially on geometric 
properties of neurons as these properties obviously influence neuron activities and 
thus whole networks. Friston [14] stressed this point on a systemic level when he 
pointed out to the importance of appropriate connections between and within regions 
- but this is exactly the geometric (or topological) property which affects the dynamics 
of the whole system. Qualitatively the same reasoning is valid for single neurons. 
Undoubtedly, model neurons which do not take into account geometrical effects 
perform some processing, but it is not clear what this processing has to do with the 
dynamics of real neurons. It follows that networks of such neurons perform their 
operations in some abstract time not related to the real time of biological networks (We 
are not even sure if time is an appropriate notion in this context, in case of feedforward 
nets ‘algorithmic steps’ would be probably more appropriate). This concerns not only 
classical feedforward nets which are closest to classical algorithmic processing but 
also many other networks with more interesting dynamical behaviour, (e.g. Hopfield or 
other attractor networks).  
Of course one can resort to compartmental models but then it is apparent that the 
description of single neurons becomes so complex that we have to use numerical 
methods to determine their behaviour. If we want to perform any form of analytical 
investigation then we are bound to simpler models. 
Relationships between real life objects or events are often far more complex for 
Euclidean spaces and smooth mappings between them to be the most appropriate 
representations. In reality it is usually the case that objects are comparable only to 
some objects in the world, but not to all. In other words one cannot equip them with a 
‘natural’ ordering relation. Representing objects in a Euclidean space imposes a 
serious restriction, because vectors can be compared to each other by means of 
metrics; data can be in this case ordered and compared in spite of any real life 
constraints. Moreover, variables are often intrinsically discrete or qualitative in nature 
and in this case again Euclidean space does not seem to be a particularly good choice.  
Networks implement parametrised mappings and they operate in a way implicitly 
based on the Euclidean space representation assumption - they extract information 
contained in distances and use it for updates of weight vectors. In other words, 
dis tances contained in data are translated into distances of consecutive weight 
vectors. This would be fine if the external world could be described in terms of 
Euclidean space however it would be a problem if we need to choose a new definition 
of distance each time new piece of information arrives. Potentially new information can 
give a new context to previously learnt information, with the result that concepts 
which previously seemed to be not related now become close. Perhaps this means that 
our world model should be dynamic - changing each time we change the definition of a 
distance? However, weight space remains constant - with Euclidean distance and fixed 
dimensionality. Thus the overall performance of classical networks relies heavily on 
their underlying model of the external world. In other words, it is not the networks that 
are ‘smart’, it is the choice of the world model that matters. Networks need to obtain 
‘appropriate’ data in order to ‘learn’, but this accounts to choosing a static model of 
the world and in such a situation networks indeed can perform well. Our feeling is that, 
to a limited extent, a similar situation appears in very low level sensory processing in 
the brain, where only the statistical consistency of the external world matters. 
However, as soon as the top down information starts to interact with the bottom up 
processing the semantic meaning of objects becomes significant and this can often 
violate the assumption of static world representations. 
It follows that classical neural networks are well equipped only for tasks in which 
they process numerical data whose relationships can be well reflected by Euclidean 
distance. In other words classical connectionism can be reasonably well applied to the 
same category of problems which could be dealt with by various regression methods 
from statistics. Moreover, as in fact classical neural nets offer the same explanatory 
power as regression, they can be therefore regarded as its non-linear counterparts. It is 
however doubtful whether non-linear regression constitutes a satisfactory (or the 
most general) model of fundamental information processing in natural neural systems. 
Another problem follows from the rigidity of neurons’ actions in current 
connectionist models. The homogeneity of neurons and their responses is the rule 
rather than the exception. All neurons perform the same action regardless of individual 
conditions or context. In reality, as we argue in the next section, neurons may 
condition their response on the particular context, set by their immediate 
surroundings, past behaviour and current input etc. Thus, although in principle 
identical, they may behave as different individuals because their behaviour can be a 
function of both morphology and context. Hence, in a sense, the way conventional 
neural networks operate resembles symbolic systems - both have built in rigid 
behaviour and operate in an a priori determined way. Taking different ‘histories’ into 
account would allow for the context sensitive behaviour of neurons - in effect for 
existence of heterogeneous neuron populations.  
Standard nets are surprisingly close to classical symbolic systems although they 
operate in different domains: the latter operating on discrete, and the former on 
continuous spaces. The difference between the two paradigms in fact lies in the nature 
of representations they act upon, and not so much in the mode of operation. Symbolic 
systems manipulate whole symbols at once, whereas neural nets usually employ sub-
symbolic representations in their calculations. However, both execute programs, which 
in case of neural networks simply prescribe how to update the interconnection weights 
in the network. Furthermore, in practice neural networks have very well defined input 
and output neurons, which together with their training set, can be considered as a 
closed system relaxing to its steady state. In modular networks each of the ‘expert’ 
nets operates in a similar fashion, with well defined inputs and outputs and designed 
and restricted intercommunication between modules. Although many researchers have 
postulated a modular structure for the brain [15], with distinct functional areas being 
black boxes, more recently some [16, 17] have realised that the brain operates rather 
like an open system. And due to the ever changing conditions a system with extensive 
connectivity between areas and no fixed input and output. The above taxonomy 
resembles a similar distinction between algorithmic and interactive systems in 
computer science, the latter possessing many interesting properties [18]. 
Biological evidence. 
Recent advances in neuroscience provide us with evidence that neurons are much 
more complex than previously thought [19]. In particular it has been hypothesised that 
neurons can select input depending on its spatial location on dendritic tree or temporal 
structure [19,20,21]. Some neurobiologists suggest that synapses can remember the 
history of their activation or, alternatively, that whole neurons discriminate spatial 
and/or temporal patterns of activity [21]. 
Various authors have postulated spike encoding of information in the brain 
[22,23,24]. The speed of information processing in some cortical areas, the small 
number of spikes emitted by many neurons in response to cognitive tasks [25,26,27], 
together with very random behaviour of neurons in vivo [28], suggest that neurons 
would not be able to reliably estimate mean firing rate in the time available. Recent 
results suggest that firing events of single neurons are reproducible with very high 
reliability and interspike intervals encode much more information than firing rates [29]. 
Others found that neurons in isolation can produce, under artificial stimulation, very 
regular firing with high reproducibility rate suggesting that the apparent irregularity of 
firing in vivo may follow from interneuronal interactions or may be stimulus dependent 
[30].  
The use of interspike interval coding enables richer and more structured information 
to be transmitted and processed by neurons. The same mean firing rate corresponds to 
a combinatorial number of interspike interval arrangements in a spike train. What 
would previously be interpreted as a single number can carry much more information 
in temporal coding. Moreover, temporal coding enables the system to encode 
unambiguously more information than is possible with a simple mean firing rate. 
Different parts of a spike train can encode qualitatively different information. All these 
possibilities have been excluded in the classical view of neural information processing. 
Even though a McCulloch-Pitts neuron is sufficient for production of spike trains, 
spike trains by themselves do not solve the binding problem (i.e. do not explain the 
mechanism responsible for integration of object features constituting an which are 
processed in spatially and temporally distributed manner). However, nothing would be 
gained, except possibly processing speed, if the mean firing rate encoding would be 
merely replaced by temporal encoding as the underlying framework of knowledge 
representation and processing still mixes qualitatively different information by simple 
algebraic operations.  
The irregular pattern of neuron activity in vivo [28] is inconsistent with temporal 
integration of excitatory post synaptic potentials (EPSP’s) assumed in classical mo del 
neurons. It also introduces huge amounts of noise, thus making any task to be 
performed by neurons, were they unable to differentially select their input, extremely 
difficult. On the other hand, perhaps there is a reason for this irregular neuronal 
behaviour. If neurons are coincidence detectors rather than temporal integrators 
[19,22] then the randomness of neuron firing is an asset rather than liability. 
One of the most difficult and as yet unresolved problems of computational 
neuroscience is that of binding distinct features of the same object into a coherent 
percept. However, in [31], Nelson postulates that it is the traditional view 
‘transmission first, processing later’, that introduces the binding problem. On this view 
processing cannot be separated from transmission and, when entangled with 
transmission performed by neural assemblies spanning multiple neuronal areas, it 
makes the binding problem non-existent [32]. 
Communication metaphor. 
The brain’s computational capabilities have to be understood in a metaphorical sense 
only. All matter, from the simplest particles to the most complex living organisms 
undergoes physical processes which, in most sciences, are not given any special 
interpretation. 
However, when it comes to nervous systems the situation changes abruptly. In 
neuroscience, and what follows in connectionism, it is assumed that neurons and their 
systems possess special computational capabilities, which are not attributed to other, 
even the most complex, biological substances (e.g. DNA). This is a very 
anthropomorphic viewpoint because, by definition, computation is an intentional 
notion and it assumes existence of some demon that able to interpret it. Thus we claim 
that the very assumption of computational capabilities of real neurons leads to 
homuncular theories of mind. In our opinion to say that neurons perform 
computations is equivalent to saying that e.g., a spring extended by a moderate force 
computes, according to Hook’s law, how much it should deform. We need to stress 
that our stance does not imply that one should abandon using computational tools for 
modelling and analysing the brain. However, one should be aware of their limitations. 
On the other hand, although also metaphorical, treating neurons as communicating 
with each other captures their complex (and to us fundamental), capability of 
modifying behaviour depending on the context. Our claim is that communication as 
biological information processing could describe more compactly complex neuronal 
operations and provide us with intuitive understanding of the meaning of these 
operations (albeit we do not impose that this meaning would be accessible to single 
neurons). 
Although interpreting neurons as simple numerical or logical functions greatly 
simplifies their description, it introduces however problems at the higher levels of 
neural organisation. Moreover, recent neurobiological evidence supports our claim 
that the idea of neurons being simple computational devices has to be reconsidered.  
We argue that communication better describes neuron functionality than 
computation. In contrast to computation, communication is not a merely 
anthropomorphic projection on reality. Even relatively simple organisms communicate 
with each other or with the environment. This ability is essential for their survival and 
it seems indispensable for more complex interactions and social behaviour of higher 
species. The role of communication in human development and in social interactions 
cannot be overestimated [33]. It seems therefore that communication is a common 
process used by living systems on all levels of their organisation. 
In our opinion the most fundamental qualitative properties of neurons postulated 
recently are their capability to select different parts of converging signals and the 
capability of choosing which signals to consider in the first place. Thus neurons can 
be said to communicate to each other simple events and to select information which 
they process or transmit further. The selection procedure could be based on some 
criteria dependent on the previous signals’ properties such as where from and at what 
moment the information arrived. This would account for neurons’ spatio-temporal 
filtering capacity. Also it would explain the amount of noise observed in the brain and 
apparent contrast between reliability of neural firing in vitro  and their random 
behaviour in vivo. What is meaningful information for one neuron can be just noise for 
another. Moreover, such noise would not deter functionality of neurons that are 
capable of responding to selected information.  
One could object to our proposal using parsimony principle - why to introduce an 
extra level of complexity if it has been shown that networks of simple neurons can 
perform many of the tasks attributed to biological networks? However, we argue that 
such a position addresses a purely abstract problem, which may have nothing to do 
with brain modelling. What it is possible to compute with artificial neurons is, in 
principle, a mathematical problem; how the same functionality is achieved in the brain 
is another matter. The information processing capacity of dendritic trees is a scientific 
fact not merely a conjecture. Instead of computational parsimony we propose an 
‘economical’ one: the brain facilitates the survival of its owner and for that purpose 
uses all available resources to processes information.  
Architecture of NESTOR. 
Taking into account the above considerations we adopt a model neuron that 
inherently operates on rich information (encoded in spike trains) rather than a simple 
mean firing rate. Our neuron simply accepts information for processing dependent on 
conditions imposed by a previously accepted spike train. It compares corresponding 
parts of the spike trains and, depending on the result, further distributes the other 
parts. Thus neurons do not perform any numerical operations on the obtained 
information - they forward its unchanged parts to other neurons. Their power relies on 
the capability to select appropriate information from the incoming input depending on 
the context set by their history and the activity of other neurons. 
Although we define a single neuron as a functional unit in our architecture we are 
aware that the debate on what constitutes such a unit is far from being resolved. We 
based this assumption on our interpretation of neurobiological evidence. However, we 
realise that even among neuroscientist there is no agreement as to what constitutes 
such elementary functional unit, (proposals range from systems of neurons or 
microcircuits [34], through single neurons [35] to single synapses [13]). In fact it is 
possible that qualitatively similar functional units might be found on different levels of 
brain organisation. 
In the characteristics of this simple model neuron we have tried to capture what we 
consider to be fundamental properties of neurons. Although our model neurons are 
also dimensionless, nevertheless in their information processing characteristics we 
included what might follow for real neurons from their geometric properties (namely 
ability to distinguish their inputs - spatio-temporal filtering). 
A network of such model neurons was proposed in [36]. The NEural STochastic 
diffusion search netwORk (NESTOR) consists of an artificial retina, a layer of fully 
connected matching neurons and retinotopically organised memory neurons. 
Matching neurons are fully connected to both retina and memory neurons.  
It is important to note that matching neurons obtain both ascending and 
descending inputs. Thus their operation is influenced by both bottom-up and top-
down information. As Mumford [16] notices, systems which depend on interaction 
between feedforward and feedback loops are quite distinct from models based on 
Marr’s feedforward theory of vision. 
The information processed by neurons is encoded by a spike train consisting of 
two qualitatively different parts - a tag determined by the relative position of the 
receptor on the artificial retina and a feature signalled by that receptor. The neurons 
operate by introducing time delays and acting as spatiotemporal coincidence 
detectors.  
Although we exclusively used a temporal coding, we do not mean to imply that 
firing rates do not convey any information in the brain. This choice was undertaken for 
simplicity of exposition and because in our simplified architecture it is not important 
how the information about the stimulus is encoded. What is important is the 
possibility of conveying more information in spike trains than it would be possible if 
information is only encoded in a single number (mean firing rate). As far as we are 
aware there are no really convincing arguments for eliminating one of the possible 
encodings and in fact both codes might be used in the brain - mean firing for stimulus 
encoding and temporal structure of spike trains for tagging relevant information. 
NESTOR uses a dynamic assembly encoding for the target. Finding it in the search 
space results in onset of time locked activity of the assembly. Different features of the 
same object are bound by their relevant position in the search space and 
synchronisation of activity within the assembly may follow as a result of binding. 
Thus binding in the network is achieved by using additional information contained in 
tags. 
Effectively NESTOR implements the Stochastic Diffusion Search (SDS) [37] - a 
matching algorithm whose operation depends on co-operation and competition of 
agents which were realised here as model neurons. Therefore in the next section we 
will describe the network operation in terms of the underlying generic mechanism of 
SDS. 
Stochastic Diffusion Search. 
SDS consists of a number of simple agents acting independently but whose collective 
behaviour locates the best-fit to a predefined target within the specified search space. 
Figure 1 illustrates the operation of SDS on an example search space consisting of a 
string of digits with the target - a pattern ‘371’ - being exactly instantiated in the search 
space. 
It is assumed that both the target and the search space are constructed out of a 
known set of basic microfeatures (e.g. bitmap pixel intensities, intensity gradients, 
phonemes etc.). The task of the system is to solve the best fit matching problem - to 
locate the target or if it does not exist its best instantiation in the search space. Initially 
each agent samples an arbitrary position in the search space, checking if some 
microfeature in that position matches with corresponding microfeature of the target. If 
this is the case, then the agent becomes active otherwise it is inactive. Activity 
distinguishes agents which are more likely to point to a correct position from the rest.  
Next, in a diffusion phase, each inactive agent chooses at random another agent for 
communication. If the chosen agent is active, then its position in the search space will 
be copied by the inactive agent. If, on the other hand, the chosen agent is also 
inactive then the choosing agent will reallocate itself to an arbitrary position in the 
search space. 
This procedure iterates until SDS reaches an equilibrium state, where a maximal 
stable population of active agents will point towards common position in the search 
space. In the most general case convergence of SDS has to be interpreted in statistical 
sense [38]. The population supporting the solution will fluctuate, identities of 
particular agents in this population will change but nevertheless the system as a whole 
will exhibit a deterministic behaviour. From such competition and co-operation 
between weakly randomly coupled agents emerges the deterministic behaviour of SDS. 
This self-organisation in response to an external stimulus incoming from the search 
space is one of the most important properties of SDS.  
 
 Fig. 1. SDS consisting of five agents searching in the string of digits for a pattern ‘371’. Active 
agents point to corresponding features with (solid arrows). Inactive agents are connected to the 
last checked features by (dashed lines). Agents pointing to the correct position are encircled by 
(ovals). The first number in the agent denotes position of the potential solution and the second 
number - the relative position of the checked microfeature 
 
 
The time complexity of SDS was analysed in [39] and shown to be sublinear in the 
presence of no noise when the perfect match is present. Further work has confirmed 
that this characteristic also holds in more general conditions. As noted in [39] this 
performance is achieved without using heuristic strategies, in contrast to the best 
deterministic one- and two-dimensional string searching algorithms or their extensions 
to tree matching [40], which at best achieve time linearity. 
Attention modelling with NESTOR. 
Conventional models of visual attention are based on concepts of separate feature 
maps, which are composed of neurons selective to the appropriate feature only [41]. 
However recent research [42] suggests that in most visual cortical areas neurons 
respond to almost any features, implying a multiplexing problem. Moreover, a majority 
of cells responding to a particular feature often reside outside of the area supposed to 
be responsible for extracting this feature from the scene.  
Information processing by assemblies spanned by intercommunicating neurons 
from distant areas of the brain has already been postulated [32] as the fundamental 
operation mode of the brain. This view, together with findings on long range 
interactions resulting in receptive fields spanning multiple cortical areas [43], in fact 
reduces the division of the cortex into many separate areas to a mere neuroanatomical 
taxonomy. It also supports the hypothesis that local interactions are not the most 
important feature of real biological networks. The most recent findings suggest that, 
contrary to assumptions of some researchers [41], attention may be operating on all 
levels of visual system with the expectation of the whole system directly influencing 
cell receptive fields and, as a result, information processing by single neurons (for an 
excellent exposition see [44] and references therein). 
These findings are qualitatively reflected in the architecture of NESTOR. Although 
network architecture and neuron properties only very approximately correspond to the 
architecture of the visual system and properties of real neurons, nevertheless, in the 
light of the cited evidence, we think that it is an interesting candidate for modelling 
visual attention.  
The formation of a dynamic assembly representing the best fit to the target 
corresponds to an attentional mechanism allocating available resources to the desired 
object. 
The analysis of properties of our model suggests that both parallel and serial 
attention may be just different facets of one mechanism. Parallel processing is 
performed by individual neurons and serial attention emerges as a result of formation 
of an assembly and its shifts between interesting objects in the search space.  
Conclusions.  
Much new evidence is emerging from the neuroscience literature. It points to the 
neuron as a complex device, acting as a spatio-temporal filter probably processing 
much richer information than originally assumed. At the same time our understanding 
of information processing in the brain has to be revised on the systems level. Research 
suggests that communication should not be disentangled from computation, thus 
bringing into question the usefulness of ‘control-theoretic’ like models based on 
clearly defined separate functional units. 
We claim that this new evidence suggests  supplementing the oversimplistic 
McCulloch-Pitts neuron model by models  taking into account such a communication 
metaphor. It seems more accurate and natural to describe emergent neuron operations 
in terms of communication - a vital process for all living organisms - exhibiting 
‘computations’ only as a mean of implementing neuron functionality in biological 
hardware. In this way we will avoid several problems lurking behind computational 
metaphor, such as homunculus theories of mind and the binding problem.  
We propose a particular model neuron and discuss a network of such neurons 
(NESTOR) effectively equivalent to the Stochastic Diffusion Search. NESTOR shows 
all the interesting properties of SDS and moreover we think that it serves as an 
interesting model of visual attention. The behaviour of neurons in our model is context 
sensitive and the architecture allows for extending to heterogeneous neural 
populations. 
Although the model advanced in this paper is based solely on exploring the 
communication metaphor we argue that it shows interesting information processing 
capabilities - fast search for the global optimum solution to a given problem and 
automatic allocation of resources, maintaining in parallel exploration and exploitation 
of the search space. 
In this article we focus on the implications of communication for information 
processing of single neurons, which enable us to make first steps in the analysis, 
analogous to advances in analysis of purely computational models. However, we are 
aware that the model proposed here occupies an opposite end, with respect to the 
McCulloch Pitts model, of an entire spectrum of alternatives. It seems reasonable that 
the most realistic model neurons would enjoy properties of both the computational 
McCulloch Pitts and our communication based model. Nonetheless we hope that 
adopting a communication metaphor will result in more adequate models of the brain 
being developed, eventually helping us to better exploit the brain’s strengths and 
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